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ABSTRACT
Malicious software is still a leading threat in cybersecurity. Anti-
Virus (AV) companies are pivotal in understanding and assigning
labels to new malware samples. Currently, these labels are the sole
source of ground truth information available to the security commu-
nity to evaluate malware analysis methods. However, their adopted
naming conventions are known to be inconsistent and unverifiable.
The labels are also black box since they do not represent the capabil-
ities of malware. We believe we need a white box way to determine
the capabilities of malware based on their behavior, rather than
black box family labels. The current state of the art in malware
capability assessment contains largely manual approaches.
We propose a novel method called MalPaCA, which for a large
part automates capability assessment by clustering temporal behav-
ior observed in a malware’s network traces. MalPaCA uses network
traces since most malware uses internet to carry out its objectives.
In doing so, we build behavioral profiles of malware capabilities
that are significantly more descriptive than their black box family
names. We also propose an intuitive, visualization-based evaluation
method for the obtained clusters. We evaluate MalPaCA on 1.1k
malware samples collected in the wild. MalPaCA shows promising
results: (i) It correctly discovers capabilities, such as port scans and
reuse of Command and Control servers; (ii) It discovers a number of
discrepancies between behavioral clusters and traditional malware
family designations; and (iii) It demonstrates the effectiveness of
clustering unlabeled network traces using temporal features by
producing a false positive rate of mere 8%.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Malware and its mitigation;
KEYWORDS
Behavioral modeling; Capability assessment; Malware analysis;
Network traffic; Sequence Clustering.
1 INTRODUCTION
It has been over thirty years since the first malware was discovered.
Yet, it is still one of the leading threats in cybersecurity today1.
In 2017, Symantec reported a spike of 88% in detected malware
1https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/top-15-cyber-threats-for-2019/
variants2. According to Accenture, a malware attack on a company
can cost $2.4M on average and can take 50 days to resolve3. The
global cost of cyber attacks is expected to exceed $2 trillion this
year [30]. These costs will keep increasing as the threat landscape
evolves.
The rapid spike in the volume and types of malware requires
the security community to understand malware in order to effi-
ciently defend against it. Anti-Virus (AV) companies play a pivotal
role in understanding malware by assigning labels to newly discov-
ered samples. However, there are several shortcomings of malware
family labels: (i) Each vendor has their own way of determining a
malware family. Labels obtained from different vendors are often
inconsistent [20]. (ii) The precise methods used by each vendor
are proprietary and unstandardized [38]. (iii) The current labels
are heavily based on static and system-level activity analysis. This
poses a number of important problems for the security community:
(a) The black-box nature of the used methods makes it impossible
to verify assigned family labels, causing the evaluation of newer
analysis methods to depend on unreliable ground truth labels [25];
(b) Although network traffic shows the core behavior of malware by
showing direct interactions with the attacker or C&C server [8], this
is rarely used to determine family labels. Hence, malware samples
that have different code attributes but exhibit identical network be-
havior will end up in different families, see, e.g., Perdisci et al. [35].
To combat this, we propose descriptive, customizable, and white
box identifiers for malware samples that represent capabilities and
can be used in conjunction with assigned family labels.
Malware capability assessment has largely been a manual pro-
cess [6, 39]. In this paper, we propose MalPaCA (Malware Packet
Sequence Clustering and Analysis), that performs semi-automated
capability assessment of malware. MalPaCA automates it by cluster-
ing similar temporal behaviors at the packet level, representing the
observed capabilities. The extracted clusters are used to build be-
havioral profiles that are significantly more descriptive than black
box family names. Network traffic is also easier to access than
system-level activity logs [35]. The key intuition is that malware
belonging to the same family will exhibit similar behaviors since
malware authors share code and resources [42]. MalPaCA is novel
as it adopts sequential features that keep the temporal nature of
2https://www.varonis.com/blog/cybersecurity-statistics/
3https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-cost-of-cybercrime-2017
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the traffic intact while identifying those behaviors. To this aim, it
uses Dynamic Time Warping and N-grams to develop a distance
measure between network connections. To a security analyst, Mal-
PaCA presents visualizations of clusters of these connections, one
for each capability. MalPaCA only utilizes easy-to-access features
from packet headers and can be applied to encrypted traffic.
The last step of MalPaCA’s capability assessment is assigning ca-
pability labels to clusters, which is manual. Each cluster is visualized
using temporal heatmaps to determine which capability it captures.
The temporal heatmaps provide a goal-driven approach to investi-
gate the accuracy of MalPaCA’s clustering by clearly showing the
network connections that are grouped together. This eliminates the
need to investigate thousands of network traces. Analysts can use
these heatmaps to fine-tune MalPaCA’s parameters, putting them
back in the loop of malware data analysis. The temporal heatmaps
also assist in understanding malware’s attacking capabilities, and
investigating behaviors that are similar across different malware
families. The key advantage of this methodology is its white-box
nature: it provides a visual representation to investigate MalPaCA’s
reasoning of finding behavioral similarity. In doing so, we address
the interpretability problem of typical black box analysis methods,
which will improve the stepping stones towards better detection
methods.
We evaluate MalPaCA’s performance on 1.1k malware samples
coming from 15 families collected in the wild. We also compare
the effectiveness of clustering using temporal sequential features
by comparing with an existing method based on frequently used
statistical aggregate features [5, 43]. The results are very promising:
(i) MalPaCA automatically identifies several attacking capabilities,
such as port scans and reuse of C&C servers; (ii) MalPaCA’s ca-
pability assessment works even on low quality datasets, though
additional traces result in more thorough profiles; (iii) MalPaCA
demonstrates the effectiveness of clustering using temporal features
by producing a false positive rate of mere 8%; and (iv) MalPaCA dis-
covers a number of discrepancies between behavioral clusters and
traditional malware family designations. We believe this happens
either because their labels are incorrect or because the overlapping
families share significant behavior.
In summary, our contributions are:
(1) Amethodology calledMalPaCA to perform semi-automated
capability assessment by clustering malware’s network be-
havior;
(2) A white-box visualization-based cluster evaluation method
that works without ground truth labels and brings malware
analysts back in the loop;
(3) A proof-of-concept of the proposed method that is evalu-
ated on real-world malware samples collected in the wild;
(4) A demonstration of the effectiveness of clustering using
temporal features, which shows less errors than an existing
solution based on statistical aggregates.
2 RELATEDWORK
Malware family labels are known to be noisy, inconsistent and
without a common vocabulary for all security companies to follow.
They are also heavily based on static analysis [12] and system-level
behavioral analysis [3, 41], rather than network-level behavioral
analysis. These issues have been explored in literature. Maggi et
al. [29] propose a method to find inconsistencies in malware fam-
ily labels generated by Anti Virus (AV) scanners. Mohaisen et al.
[31] are the first ones to measure the accuracy, consistency and
completeness of AV scanners. Their results show that AV vendors
produce inconsistent labels 50% of the time, on average. Popular
tools, such as VirusTotal, run multiple AV scanners and return an
array of labels predicted by each scanner, without a way to know
which is correct. This led to research on dealing with the incon-
sistencies in the family labels. Kantchelian et. al [20] proposed an
algorithm based on Expectation Maximization and Bayesian models
that assigns weights to each vendor’s trustworthiness. Sebastián
et. al [38] developed a useful open source tool called AVClass that
determines the likely family name after performing heavy filtering
on all the predicted labels. However, these methods do not address
the key underlying issue—malware family labels are black box with
limited interpretability.
Utilizing behavioral profiles instead of family names solves these
issues at the core. In order to characterize a malware family, capa-
bility assessment is done to determine the behaviors it can exhibit.
Capability assessment has primarily been a manual effort, result-
ing in behavioral profiles that are quickly outdated. Black et al.
[6] bridge the semantic gap between low-level API calls and high-
level behaviors. They extract API calls by statically analyzing a
banking malware dataset, and map them to high-level behaviors
manually with the help of domain experts. Sharma et al. [39] re-
cently proposed a method to build behavioral profiles. They select
some high-level capabilities possessed by malware by investigating
the literature, and map them to low-level behaviors extracted from
the static analysis of only 56 malware samples. In addition, their
method does not use any network traffic features. MalPaCA does
semi-automated capability assessment by automatically extracting
clusters. Contrary to Sharma et al. [39], our focus is on network
traffic analysis and we perform our experiments on 1.1k malware
samples.
There exist a vast number of clustering algorithms in literature
for various objectives [3, 9, 17, 21, 28, 35, 43]. They aim to either dis-
tinguish malware families, perform behavioral analysis of malware,
or extract syntactical signatures for detection purposes. One com-
mon problem with malware analysis methods is their complexity
in both reproducing and understanding them, e.g. they generally
involve multiple filtering phases turning them into black boxes,
giving little control to malware analysts [5, 32]. Some of the exist-
ing approaches use features from protocol specific headers which
limits their applicability. For example, there are methods only for
HTTP-based malware using HTTP request and response queries
[35], DNS-based malware using DNS queries [24, 36], and HTTPs-
based malware using TLS message types [2, 27]. Existing work also
places emphasis on using Deep Packet Inspection [18, 48], which
will not work out-of-the-box when traffic is encrypted.
Most existing clustering approaches use statistical features, often
relying on traffic analysis that uses sampled netflows [5, 14, 34, 43].
In such cases, only high-level features are available for behavior
modeling. Garcia [14] builds a behavioral Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tem by using the size, duration and periodicity of flows. Tegeler et al.
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[43] build a classification system to detect bot-infected network traf-
fic using high-level features. Nevertheless, there also exist work that
uses sequential features. Pellegrino et al. [34] learn state machines
from sequential netflow data in order to detect bot-infected traffic.
Hammerschmidt et al. [17] uses sequences of netflows to cluster
host behavior over time. These methods require long uninterrupted
sequences to provide a reasonable statistical distribution of data. In
practice, malware-related data is often scarce and noisy. In contrast,
we propose a method that operates directly on sequences keeping
temporal information intact, and utilizes minimal sequence sizes.
3 METHODOLOGY
MalPaCA clusters malware’s network behavior in an intuitive way
that automatically identifies the capabilities of malware samples
present in a dataset. The clustering also identifies samples that
share common behaviors, providing a behavioral profile that is
much more descriptive than mere family labels. The profiles are
built using observed behavior since only the executed functionality
is relevant for behavioral profiling. Profiles for individual families
can be enriched further by capturing additional traffic.
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of MalPaCA with its five
phases (P1 to P5). Network traces (Pcap files) are given as input to
the system, which are split into unidirectional streams (called con-
nections) that are clustered based on temporal similarities. Each clus-
ter is assigned a capability label by visualizing temporal heatmaps
that show the various features of the connections.
3.1 Connection generation (P1)
Sequence clustering is a technique where input features are repre-
sented as sequences, which are clustered based on their mutual
distances. The motivation for sequence clustering is explained with
an example of a computer program that randomly generates a list
of 9 numbers from 1 to 3, and the task is to model the different
behaviors exhibited by this program. Suppose that it generates the
following two sequences: [1,2,3,1,2,3,1,2,3] and [1,1,1,2,2,2,3,3,3]. It
is evident that the behavior exhibited by the program was cate-
gorically different when it generated the two sequences. However,
the aggregate of both these sequences is 2. Hence, if a statistical
feature models this example, it would incorrectly group these two
behaviors.
A connection is defined as an uninterrupted unidirectional list
of all packets sent from source IP to destination IP address. This
means 8.8.8.8 → 123.123.123.123 is a different connection than
123.123.123.123 → 8.8.8.8. We use unidirectional connections to
pinpoint the origin of capabilities, which helps build more diverse
behavioral profiles. We refer to them as Outgoing and Incoming
connections based on their direction with respect to the localhost.
It is noteworthy that we do not use IP address as a feature, but only
to create connections.
Ideally, a connection captures one complete capability. But re-
alistically, the length of the connection needs to be capped to a
fixed threshold in order to avoid introducing artifacts due to the
considerable variance in the lengths of the sequences. Following
the guidelines of Korczyński at al. [22], we analyze only the first
few packets of a connection, often referred to as the handshake.
This is a fixed number denoted by the tunable parameter len. It
should be large enough to allow the handshake to be modeled, the
length of which is often unknown in network traffic analysis. More-
over, larger value of len also increases the computational resources
required to process longer connections. Finding a trade-off between
capturing most handshakes and limiting computation requirements
is important.
3.2 Feature-set extraction (P2)
The choice of feature-set is crucial for determining the kind of
behaviors that are identified by MalPaCA. Two considerations mo-
tivate our choice: 1) MalPaCA should be generalizable to more than
one type of malware; 2) The feature set is small and easy to extract.
Hence, we cannot use features extracted from the packet payload it-
self as they limit the applicability of the method. We also do not use
IP addresses as they are easy to spoof and are considered Personally
Identifiable Information4 in countries like the Netherlands.
We use four sequential features: (i) packet size, (ii) time inter-
val, (iii) source port, (iv) destination port. All four features are
independent of the protocol type, making them available for every
connection. Although these features are simplistic, their sequential
nature captures behavioral changes effectively. Each feature is rep-
resented as a list of observations for individual time points, instead
of aggregating them.
Packet sizemeasures the size of the IP datagram of each packet
in bytes. Time interval captures the inter packet arrival time in
milliseconds. We use time interval because malware tends to show
a periodic behavior, e.g. bots send periodic heartbeat packets5 to
inform the C&C server about the infected host. MalPaCA is meant
to be used on a single network at a time since using inter-arrival
time makes connections collected on different latency networks
incomparable. Port numbers can be considered as the doors that
hosts use to communicate with the outside world. We use both
source and destination port numbers because the connections are
unidirectional. We particularly use source port for analysts to limit
the use of problematic ports in case of outgoing connections. We
can also identify the protocol used by the malware based on port
information, e.g. Port 80 indicates HTTP-basedmalware while 53 in-
dicates DNS-based malware. Moreover, usage of certain vulnerable
ports can indicate suspicious activity. We build one separate se-
quence for each feature, resulting in four sequences per connection.
Figure 2 shows that each connection is represented as a quadruple
(f 1, f 2, f 3, f 4), where each element is a sequential feature.
3.3 Distance measure (P3)
In order to reason about behavioral similarity, we must be able to
measure distance between sequences. Three considerations moti-
vate our choice of the distance measures used: 1) Different distance
measures are applicable on nominal and ratio data types; 2) The
distance measure should be intuitive to help understand the results;
3) The distance measure must produce results that are resilient to
delays and noise, which are common characteristics of network
traces. The last consideration was added after observing distance
measures producing results that were artifacts of network delays,
instead of behavioral differences. MalPaCA uses a combination of
4https://www.enterprisetimes.co.uk/2016/10/20/ecj-rules-ip-address-is-pii/
5https://www.ixiacom.com/company/blog/mirai-botnet-things
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Figure 1: The MalPaCA framework. Connections are clustered on behavioral similarities. Each cluster captures a capability.
Figure 2: Sequence generation: Each malware sample is bro-
ken into multiple connections. Each connection is repre-
sented by 4 features, each of which is a sequence. MalPaCA
clusters connections based on similar feature sequences.
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) and N-gram analysis to measure
distance between two connections.
DTW has applications in shape-matching and time-series classi-
fication, such as in fingerprint verification [23], and characterizing
DDoS attack dynamics [46]. Bio-informatics and Computational
linguistics have used Ngrams long before their application in cyber-
security, e.g., in modeling genomic sequences [45] and file matching
[26]. They have also been used to classify malicious code [1].
Dynamic Time Warping. DTW [4] is used to measure dis-
tances between numeric sequences (packet size and time interval)
due to its robustness to delays and noise, which is a common charac-
teristic of network traffic. It aligns two time-series that may contain
distortions (or warps) in the time-axis. It finds local substructures
in one sequence and maps them to those of the other sequence. A
visual representation of DTW is shown in Figure 3.
The output of DTW is a similarity score. It is normalized using
Eq. (1), and converted to distance using Eq. (2).
normedi =
xi −min(x)
max(x) −min(x) (1)
where x = [x1, x2, x3, ... , xn ] and normedi is the normalized value
of xi .
distance = 1.0 − similarity (2)
where the similarity score has been scaled to the range [0-1].
Ngram analysis. Port numbers are represented as Ngrams and
the distance between them is measured in the vector space using
Figure 3: Dynamic Time Warping aligns sequences to mini-
mize distance between two time-series. Blue and orange are
two time series and the green dotted line showswhichpoints
are mapped together by DTW.
Cosine similarity. An Ngram is defined as the set of n (called order
henceforth) consecutive items in a given sequence. Ngrams capture
the structure of a sequence from a statistical point of view. The
larger the value of order is, the more structure is captured within a
single ngram. A sequence is converted into a set of ngrams, called
its Ngram profile, by using a sliding window of length order . An
example for order = 2 is shown in Table 1, where A,B,C,D are
hypothetical port numbers. Next, a set of distinct Ngrams, called C ,
is generated from the whole dataset. For each sequence, a numeric
list equal to the length of C is generated. For each Ngram in C, its
frequency in the sequence’s Ngram profile is appended to the list. If
the Ngram does not exist in the Ngram profile, 0 is appended instead.
This step transforms the profiles into their vector representation.
Table 1: Example of Measuring Distance Between Two Cate-
gorical Sequences Using Ngrams and Cosine Similarity.
Input Ngram profiles C=[AB,BC,CB,DA,CA] Cosine distance
ABCBC AB,BC,CB,BC [1,2,1,0,0]
0.3876
DABCA DA,AB,BC,CA [1,1,0,1,1]
In the vector space,Cosine similarity is one of themost frequently
used similarity score. It is determined by the angle between two
non-zero vectors. The similarity value lies between 0 and 1, where 1
means that the two vectors are the same (parallel to each other) and
0 means they are completely different (orthogonal to each other). It
is converted to distance using Eq. (2). Cosine similarity is selected
as the distance measure because of its robustness.
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Finally, the DTW and cosine distances are combined to calculate
the final distance between two connections using Eq. (3).
dconn (a,b) =
dpacketSize (a,b) + dinterval (a,b)+
dsourcePor t (a,b) + ddestPor t (a,b)
4 (3)
where a and b are two connections;dconn (a,b) is the final calculated
distance between a and b; dpacketSize (a,b) is the DTW distance
between the sequences of packet sizes of a and b; dinterval (a,b)
is the DTW distance between the sequences of intervals between
a and b; dsourcePor t (a,b) and ddestPor t (a,b) are the Cosine dis-
tances between the sequences of source ports and destination ports
between a and b, respectively.
3.4 HDBScan Clustering (P4)
A key strength of MalPaCA is the clustering algorithm itself. There
exists a familial structure among malware samples [40, 44]. There-
fore, it makes sense to use hierarchical clustering to model their
relationships. We have used Hierarchical Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications with Noise (HDBScan) [7] for this pur-
pose. The key strengths of HDBScan are twofold: a) it automatically
determines thre optimal number of clusters, (b) its generated clus-
ters remain stable over time. In addition, at the time of writing
this paper, HDBScan is the best clustering algorithm, especially for
Python implementations6.
It requires a pairwise distance matrix as input. It does not force
data points to become part of clusters—all data points whose mem-
bership to a cluster cannot be determined are considered to be noise.
In the current context, noise refers to behaviors that are either too
different from all the others or cannot be clearly assigned to one
cluster. An ideal dataset with clear cluster boundaries will have no
noise. Hence, in the presence of a less ideal dataset, noise is dis-
carded to extract high-quality clusters. Keep in mind that discarding
excessive connections as noise can also be counterproductive. We
discuss this limitation in Section 6.
Evasion resilience. Knowing MalPaCA’s internals, attackers
can attempt to evade it by designing malware that exhibits a wide
range of randomized behavior to avoid falling into a specific cluster.
If the updated malware still accomplishes the same tasks, it has to
show the same core network behaviors. The usage of Dynamic Time
Warping distance makes our system resilient to random delays [11]
and due to the relative distancemeasures used in HDBScan, random-
ized port numbers [13] will also be clustered together. Nonetheless
if they manage to evade MalPaCA, the malware sample will end up
with a different behavioral profile making analysts more prone to
analyze it.
3.5 Cluster visualization (P5)
Formalizing cluster quality without ground truth is a fundamental
challenge in clustering. Although some metrics exist that capture
cluster quality (i.e. Silhouette index [37] and DB Index [10]), they
are not applicable to MalPaCA. They require a notion of a point’s
distance from its cluster centroid, which does not work well with
6http://hdbscan.readthedocs.io/en/latest/comparing_clustering_algorithms
.html
sequences since each data point (or connection) is represented as
a vector of its relative distances from the other points. Since each
connection is represented by four sequences, a single number does
not adequately capture the intricacies that we can otherwise see
via visualizations. We validate MalPaCA using temporal heatmaps
since we do not have any ground truth at capability level.
We define the following properties to be indicative of good clus-
tering: (1) Cluster homogeneity is high—a cluster contains only
similar connections. (2) Cluster separation is high—each cluster
captures a different capability. (3) Clusters are small and specific
so they only capture the core capability. The first two properties
ensure that we obtain meaningful capability-based clusters, the
third ensures that only the core capabilities are captured in the
clusters.
We use temporal heatmaps for a white box cluster analysis. The
analyst can inspect heatmaps to determine which attacking capa-
bility is captured in a cluster. This gives malware analysts more
control over the cluster debugging phase. We leave the automation
of this process as future work.
Four temporal heatmaps are associated to each cluster, one cor-
responding to each feature. Each row in a heatmap shows the corre-
sponding feature sequence of the first len packets in a connection
contained in that cluster. A set of example heatmaps is shown in
Figure 4. The figure highlights one dissimilar connection among
the eight in the cluster.
False Positive Analysis. Because we are in an unsupervised
setting without a factual ground-truth, evaluation is subjective and
the resulting clusters need to be manually analyzed to determine
if they are meaningful. Visualizing the cluster content helps to
identifywhich connections do not belong in a cluster. A false positive
(FP) is defined as a connection that is placed in cluster X despite
half of its features being different from the remaining connections
in the cluster. Since each feature currently holds equal weight,
we only consider a connection as FP if more than two features
differ. We consider two features different if more than 50% of their
sequences differ so significantly that a different color appears on
the temporal heatmap. Figure 4 shows a cluster containing one FP,
highlighted in red. It shows that three out of four feature values of
this connection are significantly different from other connections
in the same cluster. The FP rate is calculated as F PsClustersize , i.e.,
1
8 .
We measure the FP rate of each cluster similarly, and calculate the
average percentage of FPs per cluster as a notion of cluster quality.
In practice, we first establish the common majority by finding
two or more connections that are most similar to each other, i.e.,
the ones that have the least mutual distance. The pair-wise distance
matrix computed during clustering is used as a lookup table for
finding such connections. We consider them the rightful owners
of that cluster. Figure 4 shows a simple case where the rightful
owners of a cluster are easily visible since 7 out of 8 connections
are very similar. The rest of the connections are compared with the
rightful owners and are either considered as FPs or TPs, depending
on how many feature sequences differ. We do not calculate false
negatives because they can be derived (over-estimated) from FPs—a
FP connection in cluster X has its feature values much similar to
cluster Y, so it is a FN for cluster Y.
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(a) Packet sizes (b) Interval (c) Source Port (d) Destination Port
Figure 4: A false positive: one connection does not belong in the cluster it is assigned
Table 2: Composition of Malware Families and Their Contri-
bution in the Experimental Dataset.
Family name # Malware samples
Blackmoon (B) 887 (74.10%)
Gozi ISFB (GI) 122 (10.19%)
Citadel (C) 70 (5.85%)
Zeus VM AES (ZVA) 29 (2.42%)
Ramnit (R) 22 (1.83%)
Dridex Loader (DL) 15 (1.25%)
Zeus v1 (Zv1) 10 (0.83%)
Zeus Panda (ZPa) 10 (0.83%)
Gozi EQ (GE) 7 (0.58%)
Dridex RAT Fake Pin 7 (0.58%)
Dridex (D) 6 (0.50%)
Zeus P2P (ZP) 4 (0.33%)
Zeus (Z) 3 (0.25%)
Zeus OpenSSL 2 (0.17%)
Zeus Action 2 (0.16%)
Total 1,196 (100%)
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
4.1 Dataset
MalPaCA was evaluated on malware samples collected in the wild.
We worked in collaboration with a security company that spe-
cializes in malware analysis and threat intelligence. The dataset
contained approximately 47k malware samples that were collected
over one year. The samples were labeled using a set of YARA7 rules
proprietary to the company. Each detected sample was executed in
a sandboxed environment containing several virtual machines. The
resulting network traffic was stored in a Pcap file. One Pcap was
stored per sample. If a sample detected it was being executed in a
VM, we re-executed it in a different VM with different settings. Fig-
ure 2 depicts how connections are extracted from malware samples.
In the end, we were able to collect approximately 1.1k Pcap files
belonging to 15 malware families. The Pcap files generated 8997
connections. Table 2 summarizes the dataset.
4.2 Parameters
MalPaCA has four tunable parameters, i.e. order of the Ngrams used
on port numbers, len of packet sequences for features, and the two
7https://virustotal.github.io/yara/
parameters of HDBScan clustering algorithm:Minimum_Cluster_Size
and K_nearest_neiдhbors .
In our experiments, we have used trigrams (order = 3) to repre-
sent nominal sequences. Trigrams form a good trade-off between
performance and data sparsity, based on the results of Kalgutkar et
al. [19]. The length of connections in the dataset is highly skewed
towards shorter sequences, with a mean of 20 packets. This mean
is used as len. Out of 8997 connections, only 733 connections (8%)
are longer than the threshold. Connections from many families
are discarded because of they are not adequately long for behav-
ioral modeling, e.g. only 80 connections are retained out of 5819
Blackmoon connections. A pairwise distance matrix of dimensions
733x733 is generated using the selected distance measures. The
HDBScan clustering algorithm uses Minimum_Cluster_Size = 7
and K_nearest_neiдhbors = 7. These parameters were selected by
tuning MalPaCA on a configuration dataset, which formed 5% of
the dataset. The experiments were performed on a machine with
Intel Xeon E3-12xx v2 processor, 8 cores and 64GB of RAM.
4.3 Comparison with statistical features
MalPaCA clusters the temporal network behavior for semi-automated
capability assessment of malware families. The clustering pipeline
utilized by MalPaCA is novel in that it uses sequential features
to represent behavior, uses noise-resilient distance measures and
uses a robust hierarchical clustering algorithm to group similar
capabilities.
Clustering methods have been used for malware classification
very frequently in research [3, 16, 32, 35, 43]. A majority of these
studies use statistical features for behavioral modeling. We compare
the performance of using sequential versus statistical features. We
use Tegeler et al. [43] as a baseline to compare our results since
they not only use statistical features, but also incorporate periodic
behavior using Fourier transform to detect bot-infected network
traffic. Although the goal of their study diverges from ours, their
feature selection approach is aligned with ours. For objectivity, we
keep the rest of the pipeline as explained in Section 3. Taking guide-
lines from Tegeler et al. [43] and adapting them to our problem
statement, each connection in the baseline is characterized by 1)
average packet size, 2) average interval between packets, 3) aver-
age duration of a connection and 4) the maximum Power Spectral
Density (PSD) of the FFT obtained by a binary sampling of the C&C
communication.
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Table 3: For Each Cluster, (i) No. of connections, (ii) No. of
malware families, (iii) The capability label, and (iv) The traf-
fic direction.
Cluster # Conns # Families Behavior Direction
c1 39 9 (Common) SSDP traffic Out
c2 90 9 (Common) Broadcast traffic Out
c3 9 4 LLMNR traffic Out
c4 49 5 Systematic port scan In
c5 56 5 Randomized port scan Out
c6 25 1 (Rare) Connection spam In
c7 23 1 (Rare) Connection spam Out
c8 16 1 (Rare) Malicious subnet Out
c9 11 1 (Rare) Connection spam Out
c10 9 2 HTTPs traffic Out
c11 8 2 C&C Reuse In
c12 18 4 HTTPs traffic In
c13 25 5 Misc. In
c14 10 3 Misc. In
c15 20 3 Misc. In
c16 12 3 Misc. Out
c17 19 3 Misc. Out
c18 10 4 Misc. Out
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
MalPaCA produces 18 clusters from the dataset. There are, on
average, 25 connections in each cluster. The algorithm discards 284
connections as noise. Table 3 enumerates the number of connections
in each cluster.
Table 3 also lists the behaviors captured by each cluster along
with how popular that behavior is among the malware families. We
describe a few of the interesting behaviors obtained by MalPaCA.
We also contrast our clustering results with IP-based blacklisting
[15], which is a very common practice in security companies.
1. Connection Direction Identification.MalPaCA successfully
identifies the direction of traffic flow even though no such feature
is used. The clusters and their traffic direction are listed in Table 3.
Interestingly, we continue to see this pattern evenwhen port-related
features are removed from the clustering. Hence, the sequence of
packet sizes and their inter-arrival time are collectively indicative
of the flow direction. This important trait identifies whether the
suspicious behavior is originating from inside the network or from
outside it.
2. Device Probing. Some clusters capture connections that connect
to the same host. For example, one cluster contains all connections
broadcasting to 239.255.255.250, which is used by the SSDP protocol
to find Plug and Play devices. Another cluster captures all connec-
tions broadcasting to 224.0.0.252, which is used by the Link-Local
Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) protocol to find local network
computers. These clusters could easily have been obtained by using
IP-based blacklist, but they would not have clustered behaviorally
similar hosts with different IP addresses.
3. Split-personality C&C Servers. In several instances, an in-
fected host was observed responding differently to the same re-
quest, so much so that the resulting connections ended up in dif-
ferent clusters. For example, two connections of Gozi-ISFB contact
46.38.238.XX, which has been reported as a malicious server located
in Germany. The outgoing connections are identical as they both
request for the same resource. However, the responses received are
very different—the first response contains a small packet followed
by a series of 1200-byte packets, while the second one contains
a periodic list of small and large packets in the range of 600 to
1800 bytes. This insight portrays a better picture of the behavior of
said C&C server. In contrast, a blacklist would have grouped these
connections since they belong to the same host.
4. Port Scan Detection. Some clusters capture a Port Scan8, which
is a method for determining open ports on a device in a network.
Port scans are usually a part of the reconnaissance phase in the
attack kill chain [47]. Utilizing sequences of port numbers enables
us to detect any suspicious temporal behavior before an attack
happens. The clusters identify two types of port scans: (i) Systematic
port scan where ports are swept incrementally, which is seen as a
gradient in the corresponding heat map; and (ii) Randomized port
scan where ports are contacted randomly, which shows up in the
heat map as a checkered pattern. See Figure 5. Port scans carried
out by different connections are clustered together if they contact
the same range of port numbers, which increases their mutual
similarity. This result is in direct contrast with Mohaisen et al. [32]
who conclude that port numbers are the least useful features in
distinguishing malware families.
(a) Systematic port scan. (b) Randomized port scan.
Figure 5: Example clusters showing systematic and random-
ized port scans
5. C&C Reuse by Multiple Families. One cluster contains con-
nections from different families that contact the same C&C server,
and their temporal heatmaps look behaviorally identical. The cluster
includes three Zeus-Panda (ZPA) connections and one Blackmoon
(B) connection who contact a single IP address (encoded as 009),
which has been reported as malicious. Figure 6 shows the temporal
heatmaps of this cluster associated to the packet size and interval
features. The said connections are highlighted in green. The source
port of 6 and destination port of 80 remains constant for the whole
cluster. This result suggests that either the YARA rules mislabeled
one of the samples or that the authors of these samples shared the
C&C server.
6. Malicious Subnet Identification. In some instances, several
connections contact IP addresses that fall in the same subnet. For
example, two Zeus-VM-AES connections contact one host from
62.113.203.XX subnet, while another connection detected 15 days
later contacts another host in the said subnet. Similarly, two Zeus-
Panda connections and one Blackmoon connection contact two
hosts in 88.221.14.XX subnet. This gives actionable intelligence to
8https://whatismyipaddress.com/port-scan
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(a) Packet sizes (b) Interval
Figure 6: Zeus Panda and Blackmoon connections reusing
the same C&C server.
ISPs to investigate if other IPs in these subnets are also hosting
C&C servers.
5.1 Malware Capability Assessment
By visualizing the behavioral trend of various features using tem-
poral heatmaps, we successfully assigned labels to 12 clusters. Six
clusters were left unlabelled sincewe could not identify the captured
capability simply by exploring temporal heatmaps. It is interesting
to note that these particular clusters were also the source of false
positives. Table 3 shows that SSDP and Broadcast traffic are the most
common behaviors and are both specific to Windows OS. Since
the dataset is composed of Windows-based malware, it explains
why 9 out of 12 families have connections in these two clusters. On
the contrary, Connection Spam and Malicious Subnet are the rarest
behaviors.Malicious Subnet only captures Zeus-VM-AES. Gozi-ISFB
opens numerous connections, creating a Connection Spam. The in-
coming connections are stored in one cluster, while the outgoing
traffic is split into two clusters due to the difference in the type
of requests. This detailed behavioral analysis enables the identi-
fication of interesting clusters to analyze further. MalPaCAâĂŹs
goal is to identify different behaviors in the network traffic and it
does so regardless of their maliciousness and origin. Therefore, the
resulting clusters can contain benign behaviors as well as malicious
ones. The common clusters can be discarded if they contain known-
benign behaviors, drastically reducing the number of connections
to analyze.
Behavioral profiling.MalPaCA helps build behavioral profiles
of malware families using the capabilities they were observed ex-
hibiting. Table 4 lists the behavioral profiles for eachmalware family
in our dataset. Dridex, Gozi-EQ, Zeus-P2P and Zeus-v1 only gen-
erate either SSDP or Broadcast traffic. Since this traffic is obtained
from standard Windows services, it is likely that the malware was
not activated when the associated Pcap files were recorded. Hence,
the only connections observed from these families seem benign. On
the contrary, Gozi-ISFB has the most diverse profile. Its connections
are found in 16 out of 18 clusters, which exhibit attacking capabili-
ties such as Port Scans and Connection Spamming. Specifically, the
Connection Spamming behavior is never exhibited by any other mal-
ware family in the dataset. There are two reasons for Gozi-ISFB’s
diversity: (i) Gozi-ISFB is the largest family under consideration
with longer sequences on average, so many of its behavioral aspects
are captured; and (ii) Gozi-ISFB opens more connections per sample
compared to other families. For example, one sample of Gozi-ISFB
opens 111 connections, while the average number of connections
for other families is 3.
Performance Analysis. The temporal heatmaps show that on
average, 8.3% connections per cluster are incorrectly placed—their
feature sequences are different from their member connections in
a cluster. Upon further analysis, majority of the FPs originate from
the last 6 clusters. The FPR is not significantly high for an unsu-
pervised setting since not all of these connections require manual
revision. The behavioral profiles are not intended for automated
deployment at scale but human-in-the-loop exploration. Addition-
ally, the overview is easy to understand and reproduce in contrast
to malware family labels.
5.2 Effectiveness of Sequential Features
MalPaCA’s strength is in its use of sequential features for clustering.
We compare the effectiveness of MalPaCA with an existing method
by Tegeler et al. [43] that is based on statistical aggregates. The
baseline method results in 22 clusters, with an average of 21.2
connections per cluster. 265 connections are discarded as noise.
These results are in comparison with sequence clustering – 18
clusters; on average 25 connections per cluster; 284 connections
discarded as noise.
Baseline seems to perform better with smaller cluster size on
average and discarding fewer connections as noise. However, their
temporal heatmaps reveal important insights:
1. With statistical features, connections present in most clusters
appear very different from their member connections. On aver-
age, 57.5% connections per cluster have visually different temporal
heatmaps, compared to 8.3% for sequential features. Figure 7 shows
a cluster from the baseline. It has nine connections, out of which
six are FPs based on their behavior. The rightful owners of the
cluster are the connections that have the least mutual distance,
i.e. GI|090|178→021, GI|073|610→131, GI|073|610→346. The
other six connections have minor differences in all features, except
the source port which is 6 for all. They were primarily clustered
together because their statistical features had the least mutual dis-
tance in the dataset, i.e. averaдe_time_interval = 19.77 ± 3.11;
f f t = 0.07±0.05; averaдe_duration = 397.7±61.7; averaдe_bytes
= 573.3 ± 113.8. The temporal heatmaps clearly show behavioral
differences missed by the statistical features.
2. Statistical features are also unable to identify the direction of net-
work traffic. In the cluster shown in Figure 7, there is one incoming
connection in the cluster along with eight outgoing ones. A similar
trend is observed for 19 out of 22 clusters. In contrast, sequences
of packet size and inter-arrival time are enough to identify traffic
direction in sequence clustering.
In summary, while statistical features may be simple to use, they
lose behavioral information that plays a crucial role in accurately
determining similarities in malware behavior. Different behavioral
profiles may look the same from a statistical viewpoint. However,
sequence clustering performs significantly better in modeling be-
havior than statistical features.
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Table 4: Malware families’ behavioral profiles. Columns are Malware Families. Rows are capabilities extracted by MalPaCA.
B C D DL GE GI R Z ZP ZPa Zv1 ZVA
SSDP traffic X X X X X X X X - X - X
Broadcast traffic X X - X - X X - X - X X
LLMNR traffic X X - X - X - - - - - -
System. port scan X X - - - X X - - - - X
Random. port scan X X - - - X X - - - - X
In conn spam - - - - - X - - - - - -
Out conn spam - - - - - X - - - - - -
Malicious Subnet - - - - - - - - - - - X
In HTTPs - X - X - X - - - X - -
Out HTTPs - - - - - X - - - X - -
C&C reuse X - - - - - - - - X - -
Misc. X X - X - X - X - X - X
# Clusters 7 11 1 8 1 16 4 2 1 7 1 7
(a) Packet sizes (b) Interval (c) Destination Port
Figure 7: Six out of nine behaviorally different connections
clustered together in baseline version.
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Limitations. Performance optimizations are needed to make se-
quence clustering more efficient and scalable. In MalPaCA, DTW
forms the main bottleneck as the length of sequences grows longer.
There exist streaming versions of DTW that compute results in
real-time. One such technique is presented by Oregi et al. [33].
Moreover, using Locality Sensitive Hashing [3] can make MalPaCA
scalable by reducing distance computations.
Secondly, density-based clustering discards rare events as noise.
It makes sense if the dataset is noisy. However, in the presence of a
purely malicious dataset, the connections that lie in lower-density
regions may represent rare attacking capabilities, which will be
discarded in the current implementation.
Lastly, the specificity of the identified behaviors is highly de-
pendent on the length of sequences. The shorter sequences only
capture the handshake, while longer sequences can capture the ad-
ditional behavior too. At longer lengths, significantly more clusters
are formed, each highly specific to a certain kind of behavior. At
shorter lengths, those differences diminish, and the clusters start to
merge. For example, at len = 50 several clusters capture slightly dif-
ferent variations of port scans, while at len = 20 all those variations
merge to form only a few clusters.
Future work. There are several research directions this work
can take: (i) We will work on fully automating the capability as-
sessment of malware by building a directory of observed behaviors,
which will be used for cluster labeling. (ii) We will test and improve
MalPaCA’s adversarial evasion resilience. (iii) We will integrate
additional behavioral data sources in MalPaCA so the profiles are
based on all static, system-level and network behavior. (iv) Since
MalPaCA is a generic technique, we will test its applicability in
building behavioral profiles for everyday-use software.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose MalPaCA, an intuitive network traffic-
based method to perform malware capability assessment. It clusters
malware according to its capabilities using sequence clustering. We
also propose a visualization-based cluster evaluation method whose
key advantage is its white-box nature, allowing malware analysts
to investigate, understand, and even correct labels, if necessary.
We implement MalPaCA and evaluate it on real-world financial
malware samples collected in the wild. MalPaCA identifies various
attacking capabilities automatically, such as port scans and reuse of
C&C servers. We discover a number of samples that do not adhere
to their family names, either because of incorrect labeling by black-
box solutions or extensive overlap in the families’ behavior. We also
show that sequence clustering outperforms existing methods based
on statistical features by making only 8% mistakes as opposed to
57%.
MalPaCA, with its visualizations and capability assessment, can
actively support the understanding of malware samples. The result-
ing behavioral profiles givemalware researchers amore informative
and actionable characterization of malware than current family des-
ignations.
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